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Abstract
We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) in which the rm's owner oers the man-
ager a contract consisting of rm prot and social welfare. We derive
three results that distinctly dier from existing ndings. First, CSR
decisions are strategic complements for rms. Second, with simulta-
neous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost,
despite the fact that rms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally,
with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower rm, the leader
rm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower rm can enjoy a prot
equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot{Stackelberg game.
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1 Introduction
Many rms pursue not only their own prots but also corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR). Then again, some rms do not exhibit CSR. A large
number of empirical studies have shown how introducing CSR aects rm
performance. However, the results are mixed. In evidence, Margolis and
Walsh (2003) survey 109 analyses of the relationship between CSR and rm
nancial performance and nd a positive relationship in 54 studies, a neg-
ative relationship in 7 studies, and insignicant relationships in 28 studies.
The remaining 20 studies report mixed ndings. Consequently, the potential
for rm protability to improve following the introduction of CSR remains
controversial. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical frame-
work to enable us to understand which rms have an incentive to exhibit
CSR as a means of maximizing their prots.
Recently, some studies have examined the components of rm objective
functions outside their own prots, including that relating to CSR, com-
prising social welfare and consumer surplus. For example, Matsumura and
Ogawa (2014) examine the former and thus assume that rms care about
both their own prots and social welfare.1 They then investigate an endoge-
nous timing game in which rms choose their actions and the timing of these
actions. Alternatively, Kopel and Brand (2012) and Goering (2012) focus
on the latter and thus regard rm objectives as comprising both prots and
consumer surplus. Kopel and Brand (2012) consider that the social responsi-
ble owner oers the manager a contract including the rm's prot and sales
revenue to maximize the weighted sum of prot and consumer surplus. They
then consider competition between a socially responsible rm and a prot-
maximizing rm in which both rms decide if they wish to hire a manager
for their rm. In this paper, we consider that the prot-maximizing owner
oers the manager a compensation contract concerning CSR. In this, it is the
very nature of rms to maximize their own prots, and it is to this end that
rms execute their many strategies. Elsewhere, Goering (2012) considers a
bilateral monopoly model with an upstream manufacturer and a downstream
retailer whose payo consists of both prot and consumer surplus. Overall,
these studies focus on the eects of rm CSR on competition given the as-
sumption that the levels of rm CSR are exogenously given. To the best of
1Some argue we can view an objective function consisting of both rm prot and social
welfare as partial privatization. See Matsumura (1998) for details.
2
our knowledge, Goering (2014) is the rst study that explores endogenous
decisions concerning the level of rm CSR. Goering (2014) assumes that in
a bilateral monopoly model, the retailer must maximize its weighted payo,
including both its own prot and consumer surplus, as oered by the manu-
facturer. Because the manufacturer can control the payo of the retailer, the
manufacturer can derive its maximal prot, as derived in a two-part tari
scheme.
This paper analyzes endogenous decision making concerning the level of
CSR in a delegation game as distinct from the vertical distribution channel
model considered in Goering (2012, 2014). The literature on delegation stud-
ies has established that the owner oers an incentive contract including sales
revenue (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987), market
share (Jansen et al., 2007), and a rival rm's prot (Aggarwal and Samwick,
1999). This paper studies the delegation game in which the rm's owner of-
fers the manager a contract taking considering the weighted average of prot
and either consumer surplus or social welfare. We then interpret CSR as an
incentive contract regarding either consumer surplus or social welfare.
We initially consider a benchmark case in which each owner oers man-
agers an incentive contract consisting of a rm's prot and consumer surplus
before competing in a Cournot fashion. A number of studies have inves-
tigated incentive contracts concerning sales, market share, and rival rm
prots, which to a greater or lesser extent aect its manager's decision to
produce aggressively. Using an incentive contract including consumer sur-
plus, we derive similar results to those reported in several prior delegation
studies. In brief, increasing the level of CSR can serve as a commitment
device and thus make rms produce aggressively in the market. Decisions
about the CSR level are then strategic substitutes. Thus, we show that the
leader (follower) exhibits a higher (lower) level of CSR in a sequential-choice
game than in a simultaneous-choice game.2
However, when each owner oers managers a contract consisting of a
rm's prot and social welfare, we derive the following results. When rms
simultaneously choose their CSR levels, both rms maximize only social wel-
fare and set their price at the marginal cost, despite competing in a Cournot
fashion. As is the case of an incentive contract regarding consumer sur-
2We assume that consumers benet only from their own consumption. A number
of other studies also assume that consumers are concerned with the social activities of
rms and show that rms exhibit CSR in order to meet the corresponding preferences of
socially-conscious consumers (Baron, 2001; Kopel, 2009; Manasakis et al., 2014).
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plus (as in several existing delegation studies), increasing the share of social
welfare in the rm's objective can serve as a commitment device to produce
aggressively in the product market. Therefore, each rm exhibits CSR. How-
ever, when compared with consumer surplus, the case of social welfare leads
to a more competitive equilibrium outcome, which is equivalent to perfect
competition. The decision concerning CSR is then a strategic complement.3
It is well known that there is a second-mover advantage for strategic com-
plements (Gal-Or, 1985). Consistent with this, we show that the follower
can derive a greater prot than the leader and achieve maximum prot when
rms sequentially choose their CSR level, which is as derived by the leader in
Cournot{Stackelberg competition where the leader chooses its output before
the follower. In addition, the leader does not exhibit the CSR whereas the
follower does. To the best of our knowledge, this study is then the rst to
suggest that all rms do not necessarily exhibit CSR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
develop the basic model for the delegation game relevant to rm CSR. In
Sections 3 and 4, we derive the equilibrium outcomes when the owner oers
the manager an incentive contract respectively including consumer surplus
and social welfare in addition to the rm's prot. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a delegation game in which the owner of each rm oers its
manager an incentive contract. This paper adapts an incentive contract that
considers the weighted average of prot and corporate social responsibility
(CSR), where we interpret CSR as either consumer surplus, CS, or social
welfare, SW . The objective function of manager i is given by
Oi = (1  i)i + iyi;
where yi takes on consumer surplus or social welfare (yi 2 fCS; SWg). In
this analysis, CS is given by bQ2=2 and SW is given by f2(a  c)  bQgQ=2.
Managers compete in a market in order to maximize their objective functions.
Owner i then chooses i to maximize prot, .
3In this analysis, we dene strategic complements by whether the signs of the slopes of
the rms' reaction functions are positive.
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We consider Cournot competition in which two managers compete in
quantities qi (i = 1; 2) in a homogeneous product market.
4 The inverse
demand function is given by p = a bQ, where p is the price and Q =P qi is
the total output. We assume a constant marginal cost of supplying products,
c 2 (0; a).
We investigate the following two types of timing in both objective func-
tions. The rst is a simultaneous-choice game. In stage 1, the owner of rm
i decides an incentive contract for its manager regarding that level of CSR
i to maximize its prot i. In stage 2, the manager of rm i chooses quan-
tities qi to maximize its objective function Oi that is written in an incentive
contract decided at stage 1. The second type of timing is a sequential-choice
game. In stage 1, the owner of rm 1 decides an incentive contract regarding
the level of CSR 1 to maximize its prot 1. Similarly, in stage 2, the owner
of rm 2 decides an incentive contract regarding the level of CSR 2. In stage
three, the manager of rm i chooses quantities qi to maximize its objective
function Oi that is decided at either stage 1 or 2.
3 Benchmark Case: Prot and Consumer Sur-
plus
In this section, we consider the situation where each owner oers its man-
ager an incentive contract consisting of prot and consumer surplus as the
benchmark: Oi = (1  i)(p  c)qi + i  CS.
3.1 Simultaneous choice
We investigate the simultaneous decisions about CSR. Suppose that i = 1
holds for some i. Then, rm i maximizes consumer surplus and obtains neg-
ative prot because the market price goes to zero and the constant marginal
cost of supplying products c is positive. Hence, we can focus only on the case
where 1 and 2 are smaller than one.
In stage 2, we derive the following rst-order conditions by dierentiating
Oi with respect to qi.
4We also investigated the case of Bertrand competition. However, we conrm that no
rm exhibits the CSR activity, that is, each rm chooses i = 0 in the equilibrium.
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@Oi
@qi
= 0) qi = a  c
b
 Q+ i
1  iQ
Using this, we have price, quantities, and prots as follows:
p =c+
1  21   22 + 312
3  41   42 + 512 (a  c) = c+
1  1
1 1   21 2
3  1
1 1   21 2
(a  c);
qi =
1  2j + 12
3  41   42 + 512 
a  c
b
;
i =

1  21   22 + 312
3  41   42 + 512

1  22 + 12
3  41   42 + 512

 (a  c)
2
b
:
Hence, p > c implies that 1 and 2 are smaller than a half. Next, we consider
the decisions in stage 1. Taking the rst-order conditions determining the
optimal i, we obtain the best-response functions of rm i:
@i
@i
= 0 () i(j) = (1  2j)
2
4  11j + 82j
: (1)
In this paper, we dene strategic substitutes and complements as follows.
Denition 1. Strategic variables are substitutes (complements) if the own-
ers' reaction functions have a negative (positive) slope.
Following this denition, we derive Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. When each owner can oer a manager an incentive contract
consisting of the rm's prot and consumer surplus, decisions about the CSR
level (i) in stage 1 are strategic substitutes.
Proof. If price p is greater than marginal cost c, then 1 and 2 are smaller
than a half. Thus, dierentiating (1) with respect to j yields
@i
@j
=  1
12
(1
2
  j)(56   j)
(4  11j + 82j )2
< 0:
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Proposition 1 shows that increasing the level of CSR can serve as a com-
mitment device for rms to produce aggressively in the market. Solving
simultaneous equations (1) yields two solutions, i = (7 
p
17)=16. How-
ever, only the smaller, i = (7 
p
17)=16, satises the second-order condition
for maximization. We can also derive the equilibrium price, quantities, and
prots as summarized in the following Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. When each owner can oer a manager an incentive contract
consisting of the rm's prot and consumer surplus, we derive the equilibrium
levels of CSR, price, quantities, and prots as follows:
CSi =
7 p17
16
; pCS = a 
p
17  1
4
(a  c);
qCSi =
p
17  1
8
 a  c
b
>
a  c
3b
; CSi =
3
p
17  11
16
 (a  c)
2
b
<
(a  c)2
9b
:
Each rm exhibits CSR as an equilibrium outcome. This leads to lower
prices, greater quantities, and lower prots than in the absence of CSR.
3.2 Sequential choice
Here, we consider the sequential-choice game in which rm 1 chooses the
extent of its CSR before rm 2. Therefore, we use the sux L to denote the
leader (rm 1) and the sux F to denote the follower (rm 2). We can use
the result derived above for the analysis in stage 2. The follower's CSR level
is given by
F (L) =
(1  21)2
4  11L + 82L
: (2)
Substituting (2) into the prot function of the owner of the leader rm,
we obtain the objective function in stage 1. We can derive the leader's
equilibrium CSR level from the rst-order condition determining the optimal
L.
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L =

1  2L   2F (L) + 3LF (L)
3  4L   4F (L) + 5LF (L)

1  2F (L) + LF (L)
3  4L   4F (L) + 5LF (L)

 (a  c)
2
b
5We can conrm that the second-order necessary condition for local maxima is satised
at L = 
CS
L .
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=
(1  2L)(1  22L)
4(1  L)(2  3L)2 
(a  c)2
b
;
@L
@L
=
4  23L + 402L   223L
4(1  L)2(2  3L)3 
(a  c)2
b
= 0 ) CSL  0:32;
We can also derive the follower's equilibrium CSR level CSF by substituting
CSL into (2):
CSF  0:10:
From these results and Proposition 2, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium CSR levels in simultaneous- and sequential-
choice models are ordered as follows:
CSF < 
CS
i < 
CS
L ; i = 1; 2:
We can see that when compared with the simultaneous-choice game, the
leader introduces a greater CSR level, whereas the follower does the opposite.
This result crucially depends on the fact that:
@qj
@i
=   (1  j)(1  2j)
(3  4i   4j + 5ij)2
2(a  c)
b
is negative if and only if j < 1=2. This implies that rm i is willing to
adopt an aggressive behavior (i.e., choose a higher i) as long as the other
rm is not very aggressive. The leader rm then has an incentive to ex-
hibit CSR aggressively. The follower who observes the leader's aggressive
choice introduces CSR passively, which is less than that derived under the
simultaneous-decision game.
We derive the equilibrium price, quantities, and prots as shown in Table
1.
4 Prot and Social Welfare
Here, we consider the situation where owners oer their managers incentive
contracts consisting of prot and social welfare: Oi = (1  i)(p  c)qi + i 
SW . The timing of the game is identical to that considered in the previous
section. We only modify the form of the incentive contracts oered by the
owners.
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4.1 Simultaneous choice
We initially investigate the simultaneous-decision game before extending our
analysis to the sequential-decision game. The rst-order conditions deter-
mining the optimal qi are
@Oi
@qi
= 0) qi = a  c  bqj
b(2  i)
Using these reaction functions, we derive the price, quantities, and prots.
p =
8<:0 if 1 = 2 = 1;c+ (1  1)(1  2)(a  c)
3  21   22 + 12 otherwise;
qi =
8>><>>:
a  c
b
  qj if 1 = 2 = 1;
1  j
3  21   22 + 12 
a  c
b
otherwise;
i =
8<:0 if 1 = 2 = 1;(1  i)(1  j)2
3  21   22 + 12 
(a  c)2
b
otherwise:
Next, we consider the decisions in stage 1. When j = 1, the owner of
rm i is indierent between all of the CSR levels, i 2 [0; 1], because the price
is zero whatever choice is made. When it holds that j < 1, the rst-order
conditions determining the optimal i are
@i
@i
= 0) i(j) = 1
2  j :
From these reaction functions, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When each owner can oer a manager an incentive contract
consisting of the rm's prot and social welfare, the decisions on the CSR
level (i) in stage 1 are strategic complements.
The decisions in stage 1 are strategic complements despite rms actually
undertaking quantity competition in the market. The change of form of
the incentive contracts from consumer surplus to social welfare leads to the
change in competitive structure.
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Given the reaction function, i(j) > j for any j 2 (0; 1). That is,
each owner has an incentive to introduce CSR more aggressively than does
its rival. Thus, we can derive the following proposition from the results noted
above.
Proposition 5. When each owner can oer a manager an incentive contract
consisting of the rm's prot and social welfare, we derive the equilibrium
levels of CSR, price, quantities, and prots as follows:
SWi = 1; p
SW = c; qSW1 + q
SW
2 =
a  c
b
; SWi = 0:
Decisions about the CSR level (i) are strategic complements, as shown in
Proposition 4. We observe that each owner has an incentive to introduce CSR
more aggressively than does its rival. This leads the competitive structure
to behave similarly to Bertrand competition. The equilibrium outcome then
depends on the tie-breaking rule as in the case of Bertrand competition. If the
tie-breaking rule is equal sharing, we can derive the symmetric equilibrium,
qSW1 = q
SW
2 =
a b
2b
.
As a result, if a competitive environment exists where rms pursue not
only prot, but also social welfare, without government regulation, competi-
tion in a Cournot duopoly market can achieve welfare maximization.
4.2 Sequential choice
We now analyze the sequential-choice game, for which we use the results
derived in the simultaneous-choice game. As in the case of consumer surplus,
we use the sux L to denote the leader (rm 1) and the sux F to denote the
follower (rm 2). Substituting the best-response of the owner of the follower
rm into the leader rm's prot and taking the rst-order conditions and
solving for 1, we obtain the equilibrium CSR level as follows:
L =
(1  L)(1  F (L))2
3  2L   2F (L) + LF (L) 
(a  c)2
b
=
(1  L)2
2(2  L)2 
(a  c)2
b
@L
@L
=  1  L
(2  L)3
(a  c)2
b
< 0 ) SWL = 0:
Using this value, we derive the following proposition.
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Proposition 6. When each owner can sequentially oer a manager an in-
centive contract consisting of the rm's prot and social welfare, we obtain
the equilibrium levels of CSR, price, quantities, and prots as follows:
SWL = 0; 
SW
F =
1
2
; pSW =
a+ 3c
4
; qSWL =
a  c
4b
; qSWF =
a  c
2b
;
SWL =
(a  c)2
16b
; SWF =
(a  c)2
8b
;
Proposition 6 shows that the leader maximizes only its prot, while the
follower maximizes the standard average of prot and social welfare, that is,
only the follower exhibits CSR. Interestingly, we also nd that the follower
can achieve its maximum prot in the quantity competition model, which is
as derived by the leader in Cournot{Stackelberg competition. As in Proposi-
tion 4, decisions about the CSR level (i) are strategic complements and lead
to a second-mover advantage despite the rms actually choosing quantities
as strategic variables in the market.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for under-
standing which rms have an incentive to exhibit CSR to maximize their
prots. To this end, we proposed a delegation game relevant to CSR in
which the rm owners oer the manager a contract consisting of rm prot
and CSR. We consider two types of CSR: consumer surplus and social wel-
fare. The owner determines the weight of CSR and then the manager decides
the quantities to maximize the weighted payo oered by the owner. We nd
that when the contract consists of prot and consumer surplus, the rm's
CSR decisions are strategic substitutes. Therefore, increasing the CSR level
can serve as a commitment device to produce aggressively in the market.
This result is consistent with several existing delegation studies, in which
the owner oers a contract including either sales or market share. Thus, if
the levels of rm CSR are determined sequentially, the leader rm exhibits
a higher CSR level than does the follower rm.
When rms maximize the payo including their own prots and social
welfare, we derive three results that are distinctly dierent from those in
existing studies. First, rm CSR decisions are strategic complements, despite
the fact that the rms compete in quantity. Second, with simultaneous CSR
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decisions, both rms behave as social planners, that is, they only maximize
social welfare. Further, the equilibrium price equals marginal cost, as in the
case of Bertrand competition. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, the
leader pursues prot only while the follower maximizes the standard average
of its prot and social welfare, that is, the leader has no incentive to exhibit
CSR. Interestingly, the rm that does not only maximize its prot can enjoy
a greater prot than the rm that only pursues prot. In addition, the prot
that the follower enjoys is equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot{
Stackelberg game.
The unique theoretical contribution of our work lies in showing when and
which rms exhibit CSR to maximize their own prots, including where some
rms do not exhibit CSR at all. The extant literature focuses only on the
eects of introducing CSR. Therefore, our ndings can explain why some
rms do not exhibit CSR at all. That said, in this analysis, the types of CSR
are exogenously determined as either consumer surplus or social welfare. We
defer the more general analysis of incentive contracts to future research.
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Appendix
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes in two signicant gures.
Table 1: Summary of Propositions
 p q 
CS
(simultaneous choice)
Firm 1 0:18 0:22 0:39 0:086
Firm 2 0:18 0:22 0:39 0:086
CS
(sequential choice)
Firm 1 0:32 0:17 0:57 0:097
Firm 2 0:10 0:17 0:26 0:042
SW
(simultaneous choice)
Firm 1 1 0 q1 (2 [0; 1]) 0
Firm 2 1 0 1  q1 0
SW
(sequential choice)
Firm 1 0 0:25 0:25 0:063
Firm 2 0:5 0:25 0:5 0:13
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